University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Graduate School of Professional Psychology:
Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects

Graduate School of Professional Psychology

2019

A Behavior Analytic Translation of Erving Goffman's Frame
Analysis
Tim Chi
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/capstone_masters
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy Commons

Recommended Citation
Chi, Tim, "A Behavior Analytic Translation of Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis" (2019). Graduate School of
Professional Psychology: Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects. 355.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/capstone_masters/355

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.
This Doctoral Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School of Professional
Psychology at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate School of Professional
Psychology: Doctoral Papers and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

FRAME ANALYSIS

2
Introduction

Frame Analysis was published in 1974 by the sociologist Erving Goffman as an
examination of the many ways by which human beings construct, organize, and differentiate
among all the possible meanings of their experiences in any given situation. Goffman adopts an
inductive approach to formulating patterns that account for behaviors observed across a broad
variety of settings and contexts. From this he delineates a number of concepts forming the core
of frame analysis, the practice of which simply means to account for human behavior in the
terminology and epistemology of those concepts. Because Goffman was operating as a
sociologist, he primarily approached behavioral events from a group-level perspective even as he
described many situations and contingencies that would be consistent with and useful to the
idiographic perspectives and interests of clinical-psychological disciplines.
It is precisely that final point which inspires the guiding question of this paper: how can
frame analysis be usefully adapted for the work of clinical psychology, and for what uses? The
most immediately apparent connection begins with the fact that clinical interactions are
necessarily social situations, and ones wherein the participants’ behavioral topographies bear
formal similarities to those in other social situations (e.g., party conversation, parenting). Frame
analysis would then be perfectly positioned for clarifying how it is that patients (and clinicians)
discriminate the therapy frame from other frames, and more importantly, and how they
sometimes fail t o do so. Since such framing is known to affect therapeutic outcomes (Gregson &
Lane, 2000), the application of frame analysis carries substantial implications for clinical
psychology.
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Even so, this leaves considerable breadth in possible approaches to answering that
question—psychology remains in the pre-paradigmatic phase of a scientific discipline, which is
characterized by multiple competing theoretical frameworks rather than one consensus
framework (Kuhn, 1962). Therefore, this paper will adopt the theoretical framework of radical
behaviorism—and its practice of behavior analysis—as the ground understanding of clinical
psychology. The first consideration for this choice is that some f ramework must simply be
chosen, and radical behaviorism/behavior analysis (these two terms will be used
interchangeably) remains a productive one in terms of generating research in both basic science
(Ward-Horner, et al., 2016) and applied technologies (Davids, Roman, & Leach, 2017).
The second, more compelling consideration is that radical behaviorism is founded on
philosophical assumptions which lead to epistemological sensibilities highly consistent with
those of Erving Goffman. It is a pragmatic-contextualist framework, eschewing the
essentialist/ontological orientation for a process orientation that understands any event of interest
as arising interdependently from the confluence and disjunction of other events (Hayes, Hayes &
Reese, 1988). Similarly, frame analysis views the experience of meaning as circumstantial to the
particular arrangement(s) of events and stimuli relative to some given situation(s); the functional
relations among events is what matters, just as in radical behaviorism. This philosophical
concomitance suggests the possibility of a more coherent translation between these two
frameworks, as compared to one operating on different epistemological premises (e.g.,
Aristotelian cognitivism).
With that as a departure point, the rest of this paper will answer the above guiding
question by first reviewing in greater detail the key concepts and sensibilities of Goffman’s
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frame analysis, and how it might fit within a clinical context. This will be followed by an
overview of radical behavioral/behavior-analytic concepts, after which several key concepts
from frame analysis will be translated into the behavior-analytic framework, accompanied by
clinical case examples. Through this process, the above question will be partially answered by
examining the flip-side of the philosophical concomitance between frame analysis and behavior
analysis, i.e., where they depart from each other, and how clinical approaches can benefit by
using the differences between each to fill in the weaknesses of each. Frame analysis may offer a
set of maps for further conceptualizing the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment
within a therapeutic relationship, shining attention on how various behaviors or stimuli may
come to idiographically take on discriminative, appetitive, and/or aversive functions. In return,
behavior analysis may elucidate the developmental rhythms of how individuals come to learn to
frame—and mis-frame—events, and how they might re-learn how to do the same. It is this final
possibility which holds the greatest promise for clinical applications.
Frame Analysis
Goffman opens Frame Analysis (1974) by referencing a question earlier posed by
William James: under what circumstances do we act as though things were “real”? Goffman’s
answer is the concept of the “frame”: a definition of some given situation that is prompted by
signs, and that guides and potentiates the response repertoires (including attention) of any and all
participants, by implying if not explicating roles and rules for behavior.
The first crucial concept is that of the primary frame, which is some situation-definition
that is treated as accounting for all the observed features and outcomes of some event such that
no other frames are needed to understand what it was that “happened.” This concept carries no
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ontological weight, as primary frames are not “truer” or “realer” than any others, but are
“primary” only in the sense that participants within it act only according to its definition and no
others’. This is consistent with the philosophical pragmatism of James’s epistemology, as well as
that of behavior analysis, which avoids questions of ontology (i.e., “what is real?) by framing the
act of knowing as itself a shaped behavior, leading it instead to ask, “What/how is this event
happening here?” Goffman supplies an example which carries immediate clinical significance:
the primary frame of “natural events,” versus that of “social agents.” He describes the former as
often primary in situations centered around non-sapient participants, e.g., the weather,
mechanical engineering, and is understood as a procession of more or less inexorable happenings
in sequence and/or in parallel; the roles and rules for behavior are merely descriptive. In contrast,
the latter is present in the presence of sapient participants, as it references some notion of
“choice,” particularly whether any “choices” were “made” to follow the rules for behavior; here,
such roles and rules are often both descriptive and p rescriptive.
Importantly, because these frames are often primary (i.e., treated as non-arbitrary), there
frequently exists a tension such that participation in one (i.e., human beings as choice-making
agents) appears mutually exclusive with participation in the other (i.e., human beings as
biophysical phenomena). Goffman notes that malingering is a long-standing instance of how this
framing tension is contended over by parties who may benefit or be expensed, in opposition,
depending on the instantiation of one or the other (e.g., the ostensibly “ill” child stays home from
school, to the chagrin of parents and educators).
The clinical connection is to the recent trend of the medicalization of clinical psychology
and mental health treatment—the latter term itself a product of that trend (Singer & Fourcher,
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1979; Newnes, 2004). To the extent that the social agent frame impeded the distribution of
societal resources for addressing psychopathology, the application of a natural event frame—the
biomedical frame, which treats psychopathology as “illness”—has arguably and helpfully
increased such resources by garnering broader recognition of psychopathology as problems
which cannot be adequately addressed by only m
 aking different behavioral choices. This change
is evident in the rhetorical tactics of those working to de-stigmatize psychopathology, e.g., “If I
had a broken leg, nobody would make me walk on it” (Lucy, 2012).
The consequences have been mixed, however, as this medicalization via natural event
framing has, first, lead to a proliferation of pharmaceutical interventions, some of which remain
dubious on the grounds of both overstatements of efficacy (Ioannidis, 2008; Cipriani, et al.,
2018) and industry-related conflicts of interests (Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Aho, 2008). Second,
it has also affected patients’ attitudes and expectations towards treatment (Greenberg,
Constantino & Bruce, 2006) in a number of ways, such as tilting treatment focus strongly
towards symptom removal or anchoring expectations for speed of progress to timelines
incompatible with lasting behavioral change. This broader change in clinical psychological
approaches suggest an immediate utility for even basic frame analytic concepts.
Once primary frames are established, situation-definitions are often further textured by a
process Goffman calls keying, which is an activity “already meaningful in terms of some primary
framework…transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen…to be quite
something else” (Goffman, 1974, p. 44). The term “key” is itself a reference to musical keys, of
which there are many into which a single piece could be transposed. All keys have in common
this systematic transformation of function, which is achieved by cues and signals in the
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environment and must be implicitly, if not openly, avowed by the participants in the keying.
Another crucial feature of keys is the different roles they supply, compared to the untransformed
event (e.g., watching a boxing match carries different expectations from watching a bar fight).
Goffman identifies four keys: 1) make-believe, which are events acknowledged by
participants as imitations of “real” activities and as producing no practical consequences; 2)
contests, which are derived from fighting and dominance displays but tightly framed to control
the extent of aggressive behavior; 3) ceremonials, which “function to constrict, allowing one
deed…to be stripped from the usual texture of events and choreographed to fill out a whole
occasion” (p. 58); and 4) technical re-doings, which are any activities performed for utilitarian
purposes (e.g., rehearsals, demonstrations) outside of its everyday purposes and contexts.
Though Goffman also referenced a fifth key of regroundings, which is “the performance of an
activity…openly for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern
ordinary actors,” he also noted that it was conceptually troublesome in its fluidity as a category
(pp. 74-75), and so I will not reference this key in this analysis.
A primary frame, then, can be transformed—keyed—to become something else while
still resembling something “real.” It may also be re-k eyed multiple times—children might
pretend-play a wedding rehearsal (i.e., a make-believe rekey of a re-doing rekey of a ceremonial
key). The extent to which an event is rekeyed is referred to as lamination, with each additional
keying being described as a layer. Goffman notes that layers do not necessarily accrete
continuously, as some layers may terminate at a certain point in time before returning again later.
Because keys are not primary frames, they are much more susceptible to being discredited (i.e.,
seen as a contingent definition, rather than as “just the way things are”). A participant can
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accomplish this if they escape punishment (or even secure reinforcement) after flouting a key’s
rules for behavior (e.g., playing a non-word in Scrabble and earning points for it discredits the
contest frame).
Therapy can be thought of as primarily framed as a professional relationship, where
time/service is exchanged for a fee (Gray, 1994). This frame is keyed as a technical re-doing of
the patient’s behavioral repertoire, at least from the perspective of therapists and their training
curricula. Then, because there are varied approaches to therapy, that technical re-doing is usually
rekeyed according to the theoretical/philosophical orientation of some particular therapist. This
manner of rekeying broadly falls into two types: therapy-as-relationship, which is a re-doing of
behaviors occurring in significant psychosocial systems and formative relationships, and
commonly identified with the psychoanalytic, systemic, and humanistic traditions; or
therapy-as-training, which is a re-doing of specific, problematic or under-practiced behaviors and
skills, and commonly identified with the cognitive and behavioral traditions. Of interest here will
be the various discriminative stimuli that come to function as cues/signals to behave in
accordance with whichever key obtains for a therapeutic dyad.
More interesting are the contingencies of framing and keying from the perspective of the
patient, who each brings his or her unique learning history to what they rely on as a primary
frame. Furthermore, their idiosyncratic histories will also shape the degree and style of
laminations (i.e., (re)keyings) that occur within whatever primary frame applies. For example,
some patients might over-laminate, engaging in successive and/or parallel rekeyings that helps to
evade contact with some aversive experience or meaning; others may under-laminate, and take
the primary frame of therapy as primary not just to therapy, but to “reality” itself. Moreover,
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some patients who operate on a primary frame of a caregiver relationship (as in the
psychoanalytic conception) may rekey the technical re-doing aspect to the key of contests, which
then leads to repeated confrontations and conflict between therapist and patient. Regardless of
the impact on treatment effectiveness, it would be quite revealing of such a patient’s psychology,
particularly about how they learned to treat caregiver relationships as contests.
Because framed events necessarily involve a multitude of activities not directly relevant
to “what it is that’s happening,” such activities are considered by Goffman to be “out of frame,”
and therefore not to be directly attended (e.g., ball-boys retrieving tennis balls during a stoppage
of play). The most interesting out-of-frame activities are those that nonetheless influence
activities within the frame; one of the most direct such examples is the use of punctuation in
writing, as it is rarely the object of attention in reading despite its importance. In face-to-face
interaction, such a “directional track,” as Goffman terms it, would include shifting posture,
scratching, fidgeting—body language—as well as stimuli in the non-human environment, e.g.,
lighting, ambient sounds, and symbolic stimuli. Such kinds of events are crucial to anchoring,
which refers to the network of cues that establish (“bracket”) when and how some given event is
now occurring, set off to varying degrees from the flow of “everything else.” Just as importantly,
such brackets cue when the event at hand has ended; anchoring informs participants of how an
event is both distinct from but still connected to the broader streams of goings-on about them.
There is considerable application of brackets, directional channels, and anchoring to a
therapeutic setting. Well-established brackets exist for the beginning of therapy: traditionally the
closing of the door, seating of the dyad for individual format, or gathering of the group for group
format. With the more recent adoption of a medical model of practice, it may begin as early as

FRAME ANALYSIS

10

the check-in with the front desk in some care settings. Likewise, brackets exist to denote the end
of therapy: traditionally the passage of some predetermined length of time (45 or 50 minutes
being the norm), along with conversation about scheduling or financial arrangements in some
cases (i.e., the professional frame of therapy), or again the closing of the door.
As for directionals and anchoring, therapy encourages the dyad to bring behaviors that
are typically out-of-frame, such as private thoughts, into frame-focus, whether this be the
re-enactments of psychodynamic theory or the automatic thoughts of cognitivism. This also
applies to body language and other incidental behaviors that would normally go unremarked
upon in social settings, resulting in an environment where the distinction between in- and
out-of-frame behaviors is more fluid than most.
The origins of the resulting tension that often accompany focusing such typically
out-of-frame behaviors are multitude, but they lie at least partially in changes to the roles
available within a frame (as noted above) and the expectations of how such roles are to be
performed. Goffman’s view of the relation between a person and their role(s) remains
a-ontological, in that he denies the perdurance of some “essential” self which is partially or
wholly expressed through some role(s). Because roles are pervasive—framing is a ubiquitous
human activity—there is no meaningful sense in which a person and their self could ever not b e
playing a role. Rather, any such thing as a self could only be hinted at, through brief, unscripted
glimpses of the variations in how a person plays the many roles she must inhabit. Notably, this
shares much in common with the Buddhist conception of the no-self (Loy, 1996), a conception
also heavily represented in contemporary behaviorism (Diller & Lattal, 2008; Boucher, 2011).
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This being the case, the various framings of therapy occasion ambiguity about the
expected roles and performance standards for the same (Duckro, Beal, & George, 1979; Karson,
2008), which may lead to anxiety and unsteady performance. When encountered in social
settings, signs of such struggle are usually moved out of frame (i.e., politely ignored), but
because therapy is a frame that explicitly moves the out-of-frame into the frame, it aims to block
the success of such a well-learned repertoire. This procession of events will typically produce
tension, not the least of which is due to the discomfort experienced by the patient (and in many
cases, by the therapist too). Moreover, it is in these interactions that the above-mentioned keying
occurs; keyings also rely on bracketing to denote the beginning and end of the key change.
Within the keyings that occur in the technical re-doings of therapy, more than both formal and
relational stimuli take on the function of brackets. Particular styles and contingencies of
interaction often function as these brackets keying the therapeutic dyad variously as strict
teacher-rebellious student, or overwhelmed parent-resentful child, or whatever may arise
depending on the dyad. Interestingly, one conceptualization of therapy from this perspective may
be that the patient has never learned how to close t he bracket on such a key, such that once a
relationship is keyed this way it remains indefinitely so; therapy then, might involve learning
how to close the bracket.
This leads to the occurrence of what Goffman calls framing errors, which occur when an
individual acts on a definition of the situation that differs radically, either from that acted on by
other participants or the laws of the physical world. The significance of such errors remain
a-ontological, i.e., the fact of the disjunction is not itself important, and matters only because
they will lodge that individual in “the breeding of wrongly oriented behavior,” (Goffman, 1974,
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p. 308), which may lead to adopting “a perspective that is radically inapplicable, which will itself
establish a set...of expectations that will not work.” (Goffman, 1974, p. 309). This is a pragmatic
understanding of “error,” as it is defined primarily with respect to the effectiveness of behaviors
that result from situation-definitions.
Goffman divides framing errors into three broad domains—those occurring at the levels
of primary frames, (re)keyed frames, and tracks. Primary frame errors are those which generate
“wrongly oriented behavior” at the most basic levels of situation-definitions. Delusional and
hallucinatory experiences are acute instances, but primary frame errors may also include
overapplication of either the natural events frame, leading to disclaiming responsibility for
behavior (e.g., reference to low serotonin levels or abusive upbringing), or of the social agent
frame, leading to over-claiming responsibility (e.g., reference to self-discipline, free will, “grit”).
Particular modes of power relations may also act at the primary level, such that an individual
may only and rigidly signal low-status or high-status in their role performances (Karson, 2008).
Keying errors were alluded to above, such as rekeying technical redoings to contests. The
significant consequence of keying errors is found in the degree of under- or over-lamination of
situations, such that the former produces too much psychological distance to be properly engaged
in an event, while the latter produces too little. Such mis-laminations could be specific to
particular situations, or more broadly generalized; generalized over-lamination might correspond
to instances of anhedonia (e.g., intellectualization and cognitive distancing), while generalized
under-lamination might correspond to those of hyper-lability (e.g., applying the expectations of
“friendship” to the therapy relationship). Track errors are exemplified by reading as directional
tracks that which are not (e.g., cancelling sessions as an indirect request for the patient to go

FRAME ANALYSIS

13

away) or missing directional tracks altogether; or dis-attending signs and cues that are better
attended (e.g., one’s own private experiences in the moment, for patient and clinician both). This
sort of telescoping classification is constructed such that each “lower” type of error is an
extension of framing errors at the previous “higher” level—what is taken to be part of
directional/disattend tracks depends on how a situation is keyed, and then keyings of any
situation ultimately grow out of the primary frames that organize one’s understanding of the
world at large.
In defining framing errors, it may appear problematic that instances exist in which
definitions that later turn out to be ineffective for the participants are sustained nonetheless,
sometimes for lengthy durations, e.g., a therapist collaborating with the patient (or vice versa) to
maintain a patient’s self-definition as immutably depressed for years. It is important to note that
behavioral goals define “effective behavior,” (Barnes-Holmes, 2000), and so a definition (frame)
that is ineffective for one goal (recovery from depressive symptoms) may be effective and thus
sustained for another (avoidance of conflict, for instance). Framing errors are therefore defined
with respect to participants’ goals, which are typically mixed and competing, sometimes
incompatibly; to declare a “framing error” also implies an assertion of what it is that the
participants might be after. Generally speaking, this would include at least the continued
maintenance of familiar, coherent ways of framing one’s identity and relationship to the world.
That being the case, what counts as “effective behavior” in therapy can be generally
defined as helping patients to identify and correct the framing errors, and other factors, which
lead to ineffective behavior—relative to their own goals and values—in other domains of life.
Therapy is ideally positioned to do this, in no small part because those with framing errors
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serious enough to require therapy are often in that position because of how generalized those
errors have become. Moreover, the relative ambiguity of the therapy frame itself often occasions
such errors on the part of the patient (and sometimes, the clinician), leading to in vivo i nstances
of the problem at hand that can then be behaviorally reshaped (Kanter et al., 2017; Parth et al.,
2017). The (ideally) constricted character of the disattend track in therapy is crucial to achieving
such reshaping, as it is a key process by which errors are identified and progress of reshaping is
evaluated. But because of the earlier-mentioned discomfort and vulnerability produced by this
practice, a clear and consistent frame must organize the experience of therapy, and such is not
always easily established, and less easily taken for granted.
This leads to the concept Goffman terms a “frame break”: the occurrence of competing
framing cues, and/or absence of expected cues, which reduce or eliminate the power of a frame
to organize attention and responding within a designated activity. An everyday example of the
former might be point-shaving in a basketball game, thus initially introducing a competing frame
for the participants, and then for the spectating audience if its existence is revealed. Of the latter
might be a poker game where no money is bet, the absence of which stakes removes a
behavior-organizing cue that would typically lead to the type of engagement and absorption and
cautious play previously experienced and expected of the activity. The important result is that
any activity must be properly framed so as to produce in participants the level and style of
attending and responding within an event so as to produce the participants’ desired ends and role
performances.
So it also obtains in a therapy setting, where cues learned from formally or symbolically
related activities (e.g., friendship) may come to compete with the therapeutic frame, or where
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cues distinguishing the therapeutic frame (e.g., privacy, fiduciary obligation) from similar others
are absent. In such cases, an effective level of engrossment (as Goffman terms it) is unlikely to
be achieved, making the ends of the therapy so framed unlikely to be met. If then, for example, a
friendship frame obtains as a result of gestures typically cuing friendship, e.g., mutual sharing
about weekend activities, then the disattend track that typically attends friendship frames will
also emerge, inhibiting the disclosure of important patient experiences. Conversely, if a
therapeutic frame is absent, sufficient safety may not obtain to occasion exploration of the same,
regardless of whether the explorations are about transferential re-enactments or rule-governed
behaviors or cognitively distorted schemas.
The preceding concepts—primary frames, keys and transformations, tracks and brackets,
roles, frame errors, and frame breaks—constitute a basic foundation of frame analysis,
particularly as it applies to psychotherapy. Several other concepts—fabrications and
containments, theatrical frames, the manufacture of negative experience, to name a
few—elaborated by Goffman are not here addressed despite their likely relevance to clinical
work (e.g., (self-)deception, or dramaturgical approaches to therapy), because such topics would
become too unwieldy with respect to the aim of this paper, i.e., a basic translation of frame
analysis into behavior analysis. This next section briefly reviews the practice of behavior
analysis before supplying such a translation
Behavior Analysis
Behavior analysis is the scientific practice of formulating functional relations between the
behavior of organisms and occasioning events in the environment, for the purposes of predicting
and influencing future behavior (Skinner, 1938; Biglan & Hayes, 1996). As mentioned
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previously, it is philosophically informed by a contextual, pragmatic epistemology that is
a-ontological and takes successful working as its primary truth criterion (Skinner, 1938;
Barnes-Holmes, 2000). Reflecting this sensibility, behavior analysis utilizes constructs which are
abstractively defined: they are formulations of patterns among a subset of events in the
environment, and they are not imputed any causal power in what is observed. They are simply
descriptions of sufficient detail and focus to answer some particular analysis being conducted
(Wilson, 2001).
At the level of theory, behavior analysis comprises the respondent and operant learning
principles primarily attributed to I.P. Pavlov (Pavlov, 1926) and B.F. Skinner (1938, 1953,
1974), respectively. These principles are instances of the primary causal mode utilized by
behavior analysis: selection by consequence. In this mode, “causation” is not imputed to a linear
sequence that is both physically and temporally contiguous. Rather, events that are “caused” are
simply those that continue to persist within their environment, due to the consequences they
produce on that environment and the consequences thereby produced in them; it is multicausal,
systemic, and can link “direct causation” to events both physically and temporally distal.
The very principle of operant conditioning illustrates this idea. Operant learning is said to
occur when some defined behavior is observed to 1) increase or decrease following a
consequence produced by or closely following the behavior, and 2) become cued by antecedent
stimuli—events in the environment—which have regularly preceded the behavior-consequence
relation. First, any behavior so “caused” is not simply the result of the preceding or postceding
event by itself but of the total arrangement of all involved events. Second, such arrangements
typically must occur multiple times for a behavior to become established in the repertoire,
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meaning that a behavior’s “cause” cannot be only what was immediately observed in some
particular instance(s), but by the entire history that established the behavior; it is “caused” by its
first learning trial as much as its most recent.
For this translation, several behavior-analytic concepts will play a central role. The first is
an elaboration of the above: positive and negative reinforcement and punishment. Reinforcement
can be defined abstractively as when a behavior increases in the presence of a discriminative
stimulus (e.g., signal or cue). Punishment, though never explicitly defined by Skinner, can be
conceptualized as when an alternative, competing behavior increases in the presence of a
discriminative stimulus linked to a different, initial behavior (Skinner, 1953). And here,
“positive” describes contingencies wherein the presentation or presence of a consequence stimuli
follows the behavior, while “negative” describes contingencies wherein the removal or absence
of such a stimuli follows. Any such stimuli that function thusly with respect to an increased
behavior are termed “reinforcers,” and those with respect to an increased alternative behavior
(and therefore, a decreased initial behavior) are termed “punishers.” It is crucial to note that these
two constructs are abstractively defined, and that “reinforcement” and “punishment” are not
cleanly separable from each other (i.e., when a behavior is “punished,” some alternative
necessarily emerges in its place). With few exceptions, there is nothing about any given stimuli
that essentially or necessarily makes it a reinforcer or punisher; their categorization as either
depends on observed (or conjectured) changes in the frequency of a behavior.
Translating Frame Analysis into Behavior Analysis
Frame analysis will now be conceptualized within the philosophy of pragmatism—how
can its subject matter be formulated so that behavior analysis can say something about it, such
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that the behavior-analytic frame is maintained? Since frame analysis concerns the activities of
humans, the answer is simple: it concerns behaviors that people learn t o do. From a
behavior-analytic perspective, then, it is not useful to think about the existence of “frames” per
se; what exists is people framing events. Applied to more specific concepts, there are no
“primary frames,” but instead “primary framing,” just as there are no “brackets,” but instead
“bracketing.” Recast with a focus on the specific actions of human beings, behavior analysis can
be applied to formulate how people learned to frame events as they do. A translation of frame
analysis into behavior analysis, then, consists in an explication of the learning histories and
contingencies that shape the framing repertoire, which includes behaviors such as keying,
bracketing, or breaking.
In behavior analysis, learning is usefully described as a combination of operant and
respondent conditioning (Grant, 1964). Within the three-term model of operant contingencies,
the antecedent—sometimes called the discriminative stimulus (SD)—is of particular significance
for framing repertoires. As noted above, Goffman’s descriptions of framing point out the
importance of cues and signals that bracket the beginning, perduring, and ending of framed
events. SDs correspond reasonably closely to this construct, as they are defined as environmental
stimuli which predict certain consequences following a specific behavior due to a history of
experiencing that contingency (Skinner, 1953, 1974). Moreover, once an organism begins
behaving with respect to a well-learned SD, it will typically do so to the exclusion of alternative
behaviors; Goffman noted similarly that once in-frame, a participant will, without deliberation,
typically narrow emitted behaviors to those congruent with the frame. In other words, a
substantial aspect of framing can be understood as attending (not “attention”). Having noted the
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nearly limitless range of events that one could respond to in most environments, operant learning
describes how it is that people come to selectively attend and respond to some events but not
others, as Goffman observed.
It is now useful to bring in a case example, to more concretely illustrate the translations
discussed. Given the topic and focus of this paper, a clinical case is most appropriate, even if
there is a nearly limitless range of cases that could be used from any domain of life. The case
here will concern a woman, “Elise,” in her late 30s and working as a teacher, who sought therapy
for increasingly uncontrollable bouts of resentment and anger while at work. Moreover, her
attempts to manage these experiences were failing, leading to depressed mood and shame, which
only further potentiated her resentment and anger at work. In the room, Elise presented as warm,
intelligent, and highly motivated to engage in therapy; indeed, she had been in therapy multiple
times previously, years apart, to address similar issues, and had found it both helpful and
enlightening. However, Elise noticed that practices she had learned from those therapy
relationships (e.g., meditation, other acceptance-focused practices) were not only becoming
ineffective, but they worsened her resentment and anger when she resorted to them.
Within the first two sessions, I noticed feeling impressed with how quickly Elise took to
the work of therapy, with her apparent openness to considering uncomfortable questions about
her own behavior and quickly grasping new ideas that might help her understand and improve
herself. Interestingly, Elise also shared that she had always been a star student, even when she
went through a “rebellious punk” phase in her adolescence. And she continued excelling in
college, even after being informed by multiple faculty members that she was a poor fit for her
desired career path, acting/theater. Elise also shared that she had a high-conflict relationship with
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her mother, characterized by an early memory wherein Elise demanded attention from her
mother after school, who responded by throwing a kitchen pot in Elise’s general direction.
My being impressed at Elise’s performance in therapy, then, began to resemble the
dynamic of Elise’s high performance in school and, later, at work. Like those two domains,
therapy immediately became a setting where Elise attended primarily to cues of disapproval and
rejection that functioned as SDs for behaving to avert such outcomes. Significantly, Elise shared
that her mother was categorically supportive of her academic pursuits—at least until Elise
expressed aspirations to go into acting/theater. This last point appeared connected to her
difficulties with resentment and anger at work: Elise likely experienced a history of being
punished for expressing and acting on her spontaneous desires and urges (viz. the kitchen pot
memory and being dissuaded from her original career aspiration), and was instead negatively
reinforced for “high performance,” which produced the consequences of approval/belonging, as
well as escaping/evading the anger and rejection of others. This then generalized in such a way
that novel relationships were similarly framed in this evaluative manner, including her adoption
of previously effective acceptance-based coping behaviors. In other words, many SDs that for
most do not signal an opportunity for approval or disapproval did function thusly for her,
presumably due to a history of being praised or rebuked in circumstances that result in neither
praise nor rebuke for most others. As such, those coping behaviors eventually came to stand for
the impending threat of having a pot thrown at her if she did not adequately quell her own
resentment and anger, which understandably would have produced a paradoxical increase of
those feelings.

FRAME ANALYSIS
From

a

frame

21
analytic perspective, Elise

primarily framed

many

of her

relationships—including that with herself—within an evaluative social agent frame, i.e., the roles
for behavior did not simply describe what she would typically do, but what she should t ypically
do. This frame was characterized by aversive control, i.e., behaviors were reinforced when they
produced the removal of aversive stimuli, particularly social stimuli. Necessarily, this means that
alternative behaviors in her relationship repertoire were punished, i.e., spontaneous
self-expression was met with aversive social consequences. Indeed, much of this dynamic was
characterized by Elise’s early memory with her mother as well as her memory of her mother’s
reinforcement of Elise’s academic pursuits, the remembering of which resulted in her attending
to similar SDs and all the expectations linked to that contingency.
This suggests that how she learned this primary framing has much to do with her early
attachments, a pattern also echoed by psychoanalytic and systems approaches (Bowlby, 1978;
Beavers, 1977; Levy, 1998). This is also reflected by Elise’s memories of those experiences, the
recalling of which memories is itself a learned behavior, one that appears to be subject to, and
therefore usefully tracks, recurring behavioral contingencies later in life (Karson, 2006). This can
be translated into behavior analytic terms as an instance of stimulus generalization (Guttman &
Kalish, 1956), i.e., how initially learned SDs are responded to as signals for the original
contingency, but in novel settings. Some of this might have occurred through respondent
conditioning, such that certain gestures, inflections of speech, facial expressions, or even
incidental objects (e.g., pots) took on response functions due to their proximity with intense,
autonomic respondent behaviors (e.g., physiological activation, crying). These stimuli would be
behavior-analytically described as conditioned threat signals (Andreatta et al., 2015). After
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learning this with her mother, Elise’s repertoire likely expanded these contingencies via formal
generalization, i.e., the transference of response functions based on the physical similarities
between stimuli. In Elise’s case, for example, early experiences at school would have allowed
her to generalize the size difference between herself and her mother to that between herself and
teachers. Given the educational setting, and the gender skew towards women working in early
education, personal characteristics coding as feminine may have also participated in this form of
stimulus generalization.
This raises the question of how it is that Elise could have generalized the SDs, which
prompt contingencies punishing self-expression/reinforcing “high performance,” to her
relationship with me, who is neither a woman nor larger than her. The behavior-analytic
accounting involves the symbolic (rather than formal) generalization of stimuli and response
functions. Significantly moreso than non-humans, human beings demonstrate a strong capacity
for discriminating and generalizing contingencies themselves in addition to physical stimuli
(Jovanovic, et al., 2006). This means that the experience of any particular contingency type (e.g.,
negative reinforcement) may itself function as an SD within an even broader behavioral
contingency. Likewise, humans have also been observed to be far more responsive to their own
behavior per se, meaning that the behavior occasioned by some other SD (whether symbolic,
formal, or a combination of the two) could also itself serve as an SD for further contingencies of
behavior. Behavior analysis terms this latter event “behavior-behavior relations,” which is
considered controversial as completely accounting for behavioral learning (Hayes et al., 1986).
However, in this translation, such behavior-behavior relations are posited only to function as a
class of SDs; the consequence portion of the ABC contingency I will leave agnostic, for the
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moment. In any case, such symbolic contingencies may then allow individuals to broadly
generalize a heavily reinforced repertoire from early in life. This degree of generalization could
be considered a translation of primary framing, which so defined might mean, “a set of SDs that
are so broadly generalized as to always be functionally present in the individual’s environment.”
In Elise’s case, there were two immediate possibilities for how her primary framing
symbolically generalized to our relationship. The first is the similarity of contingencies between
therapy and education: in both settings, questions are asked, and answers supplied, with the
answer itself further responded to by one of the participants. In the case of education, the
response-to-the-answer is typically evaluative in character, while such does not always obtain in
therapy. However, this hardly matters, as the initial presentation of such a contingency might be
enough to occasion Elise’s well learned “high performance” contingency. Moreover, Elise’s past
history of being (and excelling) in therapy likely contributed to generalization on a formal basis
as well, with regard to environmental stimuli (e.g., room layout of therapy offices).
The second and more significant possibility is that Elise’s private behaviors, i.e.,
“thinking” and “self-talk,” entered into behavior-behavior relations with her early attachment
contingencies. She shared that in moments of distress, she would self-soothe in a particular
“voice,” which when vocalized carried a sing-songy prosody, and it would recite statements such
as, “Things will be okay, just remember to breathe,” or “Remember to meditate.” Importantly,
this “voice” also tended to precede spikes in Elise’s feelings of resentment, suggesting that it is
an important node in the network of behavior-behavior-related responses for Elise (Hayes &
Brownstein, 1986). Given the relationship between those familiar, difficult private events, the
relationships and figures from which she learned those responses, and the near impossibility of
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precisely controlling all of one’s private behaviors (Hayes & Strosahl, 2004), such a behavior
could easily function as an omnipresent SD for her “high performance”/resentment repertoires.
Recall that this pervasiveness is the behavior-analytically significant feature of primary framing.
Keying, in behavior-analytic terms, is defined similarly to primary framing—it
substantially comprises the network of SDs that differentially predict consequences based on
learning history. Keying differs from primary framing in that the former serves as motivating
operations for the latter—motivating operations are events which change the effectiveness of
consequence stimuli to function as reinforcers or punishers. For instance, the key of technical
re-doings, which is common in educational settings, might be prompted by the presence of
evaluative responses in the form of grading. In the case of a doctoral program in clinical
psychology, the primary frame might be that of therapy, but there are additional consequences
that may follow for the doctoral student which would not for a licensed practitioner (e.g.,
passing/failing classes). When such contingencies are added, they become motivating operations
that induce the effectiveness of grades (or other previously dis-attended stimuli) to shape
behavior in a way that does not obtain absent those contingencies; when there is a sufficient
network of such contingencies (e.g., as exemplified in an educational curriculum/institution), that
network of contingencies—functioning to motivate a greater or different range of consequences
as reinforcing or punishing—could be said to be a keying. Often, the differences in consequences
produced by a keying are characterized by a restriction, or lowering, of the stakes
involved—boxing contests keying restricts the physical damage inflicted on participants, while
educational keyings restrict the professional damage inflicted on trainees should something go
wrong. Note that once an individual has learned to key, they are likely to generalize it to other
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settings (e.g., training workshops, or informal tutorials) by the same generalization processes
described above.
For Elise, therapy was keyed as a technical re-doing, which is the type of keying of many
psychotherapies. Given her intellect, Elise demonstrated some tendency to over-laminate (i.e.,
create psychological distance from strong affective experiences) via verbal analysis, but was not
inflexible with respect to this repertoire, as she also experienced and acted on intense affect when
it arose in the room. In many ways, Elise was healthier in her keying repertoires, as she neither
keyed the therapy as a contest nor fell into under-laminating the therapy (i.e., failing to key the
event, which would lead to primarily framing the therapy and making it harder to distinguish
from other relationships).
Though Elise did not typically mis-key her therapy per se, it still presented difficulties in
that the key common to therapy—technical re-doings—is the very one that for her was
over-generalized to the point of nearly being primary. Though we could (and did) work on
reshaping specific behaviors (such as her immediate coping responses to resentment), the
inflexibility of her keying placed our interactions within the very framing that was cuing the
avoidant, negatively reinforced repertoire that caused Elise to struggle with resentment and
self-punishment (“throwing pots at [herself],” as she nicely phrased it). That is, while specific
behaviors

such as

self-soothing might have been reshaped through more strictly

behavior-analytic operant learning, the consequences utilized were still the granting of
approval/escape of disapproval—her primary framing, defined as an omnipresent set of SDs,
would cue her to attend to this aspect of our interactions. As noted above, because humans are
able to incorporate the presence of some contingency itself as the SD to other contingencies (in
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Elise’s cases, approval/disapproval as an SD for her “high performance” repertoire), any success
we had in reshaping specific behaviors tended to only reinforce her broader repertoire—the
stance that approval/disapproval from authority figures are the consequences that matter most.
Such a situation creates a tricky catch-22 in therapy: if I were to explicitly discourage
Elise from acting to only please me, my very act of saying so would itself be an instance of what
I would not want her to do. Even though we jointly formulated her goals in therapy as “learning
how to not get an A+ in therapy,” it was important we did so not by habituating her to getting an
F in therapy—this, at the least, would have reinforced her primary framing—but by shaping up a
keying of therapy that was not strictly technical re-doings. We found this by moving the therapy
more into the key of make-believe, by incorporating aspects of Internal Family Systems
(Schwartz, 1995) and dramaturgical (Karson, 2008) practices of therapy. Specifically, I asked
Elise to characterize the various thoughts and feelings she noticed as belonging to specific
“characters” in the “cast” of her psychology—this had the advantage of connecting with her
previous experience and interest in theater—and then to make guesses about how these
characters, with their own attitudes and values, interacted with each other, based on her feelings
and reactions in/about various events in her life.
Elise took quickly to this practice, and she was able to flesh out a cast of characters,
including “The Benevolent Queen,” who she identified as the sing-songy voice noted above, and
who notably spoke up most when things weren’t going smoothly; and the “Rebellious Teenager,”
who she noticed was loudest before and after her episodes of intense resentment. Most
importantly, Elise began to have moments where she was able to state that she did not have an
answer about what was going on with her “cast of characters,” in contrast to her usually saying
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something insightful and impressive within the frame of technical re-doings. This might reflect
the different set of consequences potentiated by the motivating operations that comprise the
make-believe key: playfulness, experimentation, and engrossment are established as appetitive,
reinforcing consequences to attend to, contra t he stimuli of evaluation, “grading,” and
approval/disapproval that are motivated as consequences for attending in the technical re-doing
key. Moreover, one key may have the effect of an abolishing operation—events which reduce
the effectiveness of stimuli to function as reinforcers or punishers (Laraway et al., 2003)—on the
stimuli associated with a different key. This appeared to be the case with Elise, who may have
also learned to frame her experience in theatrical pursuits in this key, which put her in position to
experience contingencies that taught her to attend less to avoiding aversive consequences such as
disapproval, and more to pursuing appetitive consequences such as playing and engrossment.
The construct of “roles,” which primary framing and keying both supply for its
participants, is also important. In behavior-analytic terms, a role can be considered a repertoire of
rule-governed behaviors—verbal behaviors that track and predict behavioral contingencies, and
are generalized to settings beyond the ones in which they were learned (Hayes et al., 1986).
Moreover, such a repertoire of rules is itself linked to a verbal label (e.g., “patient” or “teacher”)
that serves as one of its discriminative stimulus. Frame analysis views a “role” as the range of
behavioral options available to the participant who is occupying that role; rule-governed
behaviors likewise restrict behavioral options, and are initially reinforced for a history of being
effective in navigating novel environments, but may eventually come to be reinforced for
maintaining their own coherence (Törneke, Luciano & Salas, 2008). As with primary framing
and keying, the roles that they specify are likewise cued by the set of SDs which direct individual
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attending, and in the case of the technical-redoing key, the two broad sets of roles available are
“trainee” and “trainer.” Each carries with it a set of rules for behaving, with the “trainee”
typically guided by the “trainer”—this suggests that the “trainer” has substantially more
influence in defining the situation, and therefore the experiences of the “trainee.” Such a frame
was clear in how Elise acted within the technical-redoing key, and in her descriptions of many of
her other relationships (including with herself).
By contrast, the make-believe key is not necessarily so hierarchical, as the playfulness of
the frame is compatible with, or even strengthened by, a more egalitarian and collaborative
stance. It is perhaps this aspect of the make-believe key that functions as an abolishing operation
for approval/disapproval as a consequating stimulus: the very activities (e.g., play) that the key
exists to support are already reinforcing without any evaluative relations between participants.
Viewed from the causal mode of selection-by-consequence, if such status relations were not
necessary to maintain the learning and teaching of this key across individuals and generations,
then there would be no reason for the key to show such features, and so it does not.
Notably, only a small part of what benefited Elise by the re-keying to make-believe was
in shaping her ability to be playful; clearly, she already knew how to do this, as evidenced by the
speed with which she took to this key. More significant was the extent to which her primary
framing—the evaluative social agent frame—and her default keying in therapy—technical
re-doing, with an emphasis on the evaluative aspect—were inflexible with regards to competing
cues in the environment. Multiple approaches to psychotherapy have pointed out that this type of
psychological rigidness or narrowness (Horney, 1950; Hayes & Strosahl, 2004) appears
intimately connected to psychopathology, and so it was with Elise, who saw opportunities to be
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approved/disapproved of in situations where 1) there were other consequences to be had, and 2)
the focus on approval/disapproval did not help her make the most effective choices with regards
to her other priorities (e.g., resentment at work). Not coincidentally, behavior analysts have also
noted a downside of rule-governed behaving as marked increases in insensitivity to novel
environments and contingencies (Hayes et al., 1986). By shaping up our therapy interactions as
shifting between a technical-redoing key and a make-believe key, Elise and I worked to
strengthen not only her ability to attend to playfulness and disattend the approval/disapproval of
authority figures, but also how to make the switch between those kinds of attending.
Shaping up Elise’s ability to attend to SDs for a make-believe keying required that the
technical re-doing key undergo frame breaking. In behavior analytic terms, breaking a frame
means that 1) the SDs which mark the beginning and continuing of a frame are incomplete or
diverge significantly in form and function from her learned expectations; or 2) that the
contingencies which characterize a given frame do not produce the reinforcers and punishers
typically co-occurring with the frame, leading to extinction (Skinner, 1974); or 3) a combination
of the two. Given that the therapy frame must remain unbroken, that a major key of therapy is the
technical re-doing frame, and that Elise demonstrated an over-generalized attending to SDs for
that kind of evaluative framing, we depended primarily on that second feature of frame breaking
to weaken the strength of her self-evaluative framing.
The key breakthrough occurred when Elise requested to change the frequency of therapy
from weekly to biweekly, ostensibly due to financial concerns. She notably described her
financial reasons for the request as soon as she made it, and did so visibly anxious, suggesting to
me that this interaction was still occurring with my approval/disapproval functioning as
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reinforcer/punisher. Instead of making a decision at that moment or discussing her verbal
justifications of the request, we spent the entire session focused on what her cast of characters
had to say about the situation. Interestingly, Elise noticed that her Rebellious Teenager
advocated for her to just start coming biweekly and that I could just “deal with it.” This led to an
examination of the function of her manner of broaching the subject, which she eventually
acknowledged as an attempt to “not offend [me].” Elise then stated directly that she felt our
sessions were less helpful than when we began, and that she simply just wanted t o come less
frequently. Set against Elise’s rigid framing of an authority figure’s approval/disapproval of her,
her directly expressing/acting on her own desire at the risk of “offending” me appeared to be a
newer, healthier alternative way of responding in our relationship. Given Elise’s generally high
level of functioning, her well-developed support network, and the relatively non-urgent acuity of
her distress, I believed that biweekly therapy could still be effective for her. As such, at the end
of the session, I left the scheduling question up to her; she herself then chose to come biweekly,
and so the remainder of our therapy happened on a biweekly basis.
This produced a weakening, if not breaking, of the evaluative frame because Elise was
not (or at least, much less) reinforced by (the possibility of) my approval or disapproval as
controlling consequences. It also mattered that she acted on an SD—her own desires—that she
typically would not in similar situations; because she was reinforced for the behavior following
that SD, the entire contingency worked to establish her own desires as effective signs for guiding
her behavior and establishing the meanings of her experiences. In much the same way that a
game of Scrabble is “broken” when players are rewarded points for playing nonsense words,
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Elise’s evaluative framing started breaking (but far from completely) when it became clear that
not playing by the rules of that frame could also produce appetitive consequences.
After several more months of (biweekly) work, Elise began talking about starting to turn
down requests for help from colleagues at school, and then asking colleagues for help, when she
was feeling overburdened—neither of which she had much done in the past. Not surprisingly,
this drastically reduced her experience of resentment towards others and herself. No longer
framing these situations as being evaluated by others, Elise appeared to gain behavioral
flexibility in how she framed those interactions: they were no longer a matter of her failing to
perform up to standards, but simply doing what was best for her in those situations. Eventually,
Elise had the opportunity to apply for a promotion to a supervisory position at her school.
Though she expressed concern about how her colleagues would respond to her doing so—the
promotion would have made her their n ew supervisor—Elise had experienced enough
contingencies cued by what she wanted, not what others expected of her, to act on the latent
ambition that had been muted by the over-generalization of her evaluative framing. As a result,
Elise ended her therapy several weeks after winning the promotion.
Ultimately, frame analysis would define psychopathology as instances of framing
errors—“a perspective that is radically inapplicable, which will itself establish a set...of
expectations that will not work,” as Goffman himself notes. In behavior analytic terms, a framing
error is attending to a set of SDs—which may include the presence of certain contingencies or
verbal rules for behaving—to the exclusion of competing SDs, which is over-generalized to
many if not all environments, and which resists extinction or reshaping despite aversive
outcomes from behaving thusly. Often the strength of such framing errors results from their
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being negatively reinforced by the avoidance/escape of some consequence(s) even more aversive
than those apparently produced (as in cases of substance abuse, continued use of a substance may
produce aversive consequences for the user eventually, but such are still less aversive than what
using the substance allows the user to escape/avoid). Though framing errors may occur at the
level of primary framing, keying, and tracking, its defining function is the context-insensitive
manner in which it motivates and abolishes various stimuli as reinforcers and punishers, to the
exclusion of competing frames. It is important here to note that this definition appears similar to
the behavior-analytic definition of primary framing, i.e., a set of SDs that is so broadly
generalized as to always be functionally present in an individual’s environment. Perhaps the
distinguishing function between primary framing and erroneous framing is to be found only in
the degree to which individuals reshape their behavior subsequent to consequences that ought to
be punishing of the primary frame.
Concluding Remarks
In undertaking this translation, my first aim is to broaden the scope of the clinical horizon
of behavior analysis, by pointing out the consilience of certain behavioral events (i.e., framing)
with a behaviorally pragmatic approach to human psychology. I specifically take the approach of
theoretical translation due to the fact that psychologists and clinicians—of all theoretical
orientations—are themselves naturally human, which means that knowledge and practices
thereby produced will themselves demonstrate the very patterns that such knowledge is about.
After all, Skinner noted that one aspect about his approach which is “radical” is that the behavior
of behavior analysts is itself subject to the principles and explanatory accounts of behavior
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analysis (Skinner, 1974); simply speaking about someone’s behavior is itself a behavior, and so
does not remove any such speaker from the stream of behaving that could be analyzed.
Of principal concern are the well-established patterns involving in-group identification
and its attendant concerns about power and prestige, which still obtain when the subject group is
psychologists or behavior analysts (Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998; Parker, 1999).
Regarding the former, this is evident in the competition amongst the many orientations to
psychology. And regarding the latter, this is evident in the lack of consideration by behavior
analysts towards clinical phenomena observed by practitioners of other traditions. For example,
concepts such as transference (from the psychoanalytic tradition) or the conflation of logical
typing (from the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead, 1910-1913, and Alfred
Korzybski, 1933) were overlooked until at least the 1980s. What changed this state of affairs was
the translating (whether deliberate or not) of such concepts into the behavior-analytic
framework—the radical behavioral equivalent of transference was formulated by Kohlenberg
and Tsai (2007) with their development of Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (“FAP”), while
logical typing found its footing thanks to the work of Hayes et al. (1986, 2004), introducing the
third-wave approach to behaviorism.
A further concern is the emphasis in behavior analysis on maintaining philosophical
coherence/clarity, as radical behaviorism is formulated as fundamentally a philosophy of science
which so happens to be applied to human behavior (Chiesa, 1994). The project of translating
Frame Analysis necessitates a consideration of its underlying philosophy towards behavioral
events, which, as I described above, is highly consistent with the contextual, process-focused
philosophy of behavioral pragmatism. Articulating such consilience between these approaches is
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the first step in bringing in frame analytic ideas that could improve the effectiveness of clinical
formulation and intervention within a behavior-analytic approach.
The case of Elise points to clinical issues resembling those that might otherwise be
labeled “transferential”; as noted, FAP has already introduced some aspects of such a concept
into behavior analysis, particularly by noting the generalization of problematic relationship
repertoires to the therapeutic relationship. However, the standard intervention sensibility of
FAP—reshaping, in vivo, specific problematic behaviors with the therapist acting as the primary
source of social reinforcers—may not have been so helpful for a case like Elise. Even had her
specific responses been reshaped to be less “high-performing,” she would have continued to be
reinforced for her stance of requiring approval/disapproval from authority figures as a major
shaping contingency of her behavior. Mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches such as
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy may likewise have continued to reinforce such a stance.
Integrating a frame analytic perspective, however, highlighted the possibility of such a
contingency not only shaping her behavior, but being a major obstacle for her life. Because
frame analysis also includes “framing events” as shapeable behaviors, it made her framing stance
amenable to a behavior-analytic understanding that could specify the SDs and reinforcing
consequences which maintained that stance. This allowed for one of her most generalized
behaviors to undergo interventions (e.g., differential reinforcement of alternatives, extinction)
that may have otherwise remained unaddressed, if not maintained, by more “traditional”
behavior analytic interventions.
My second goal in this project follows from the first, and is broader in nature: to increase
the communication and exchange of ideas and epistemologies between different theoretical
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orientations of psychology, generally. In one sense, each theoretical orientation of psychology
can be considered a map for navigating the territory of human behavior, in the way that other
disciplines are maps for navigating their own respective territories (Korzybski, 1933). As Kuhn
(1962) noted, a characteristic of immature scientific disciplines is that of many different maps
competing for acceptance as the paradigmatic epistemology for a subject of study; this appears to
characterize psychology, which has been a distinct discipline for barely more than a century. In
order to sort through the proliferation of maps, it is useful to compare different maps and notice
any overlaps they might contain—setting aside anti-realist epistemologies, it is assumed that
there would be some unitary territory on which all maps must be based, and that some landmarks
of such a territory would simply be too prominent to be ignored. Beyond my goal for increasing
clinical effectiveness, I hope to have demonstrated such overlaps between frame analysis and
behavior analysis, two approaches to knowing human behavior that have rarely crossed paths but
which nonetheless show a remarkable degree of overlap in how they account for the diversity of
human behaving; it is no accident that I have also referenced, if only in passing, the findings of
psychoanalytic and systemic researchers and writers in the course of this paper. If the behavioral
sciences, including clinical psychology, are to continue working towards its goal of
understanding the human condition, and its value of ameliorating and improving that condition,
then the project of exchanging and integrating maps may offer yet another path towards
epistemological clarity and pragmatic effectiveness.

FRAME ANALYSIS

36
References

Aho, K. (2008). Medicalizing mental health: A phenomenological alternative. Journal of
Medical Humanities, 29, 243-259.
Andreatta, M., Leombruni, E., Glotzbach-Schloon, E., Pauli, P., & Mühlberger, A. (2015).
Generalization of contextual fear in humans. Behavior Therapy, 46(5), 5 83-596.
Barnes-Holmes, D. (2000). Behavior pragmatism: No place for reality and truth. The Behavior
Analyst, 23(2), 191-202.
Beavers, W. R. (1977). Psychotherapy and Growth: A Family Systems Perspective. New York,
NY: Brunner-Routledge.
Biglan, A., & Hayes, S. C. (1996). Should the behavioral sciences become more pragmatic? The
case for functional contextualism in research on human behavior. Applied & Preventive
Psychology, 5, 47-57.
Boucher, H. C. (2011). The dialectical self-concept II: Cross-role and within-role consistency,
well-being, self-certainty, and authenticity. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42(7),
1251-1271.
Bowlby, J. (1978). Attachment theory and its therapeutic implications. Adolescent Psychiatry, 6,
5-33.
Bracken, P., & Thomas, P. (2005). Postpsychiatry: Mental Health in the Postmodern World.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science. B
 oston, MA: Authors
Cooperative, Inc.
Cipriani, A., Furukawa, T. A., Salantia, G., Chaimani, A., Atkinson, L. Z., Ogawa, Y., Leucht,
S., Ruhe, H. G., Turner, E. H., Higgins, J. P. T., Egger, M., Takeshima, N., Hayasaka, Y.,
Imai, H., Shinohara, K., Tajika, A., Ioannidis, J. P. A., & Geddes, J. R. (2018).
Comparative efficacy and acceptability of 21 antidepressant drugs for the acute treatment
of adults with major depressive disorder: a systematic review and network meta-analysis.
The Lancet, 391, 1 357-1366.
Davids E. L., Roman N. V., & Leach, L. (2017). The link between parenting approaches and
health behavior: A systematic review. Journal of Human Behavior in the Social
Environment, 27(6), 589-608.
Diller, J. W. & Lattal, K. A. (2008). Radical behaviorism and Buddhism: Complementarities and
conflicts. The Behavior Analyst, 31(2), 163-177.

FRAME ANALYSIS

37

Duckro, P., Beal, D., & George, C. (1979). Research on the effects of disconfirmed client role
expectations in psychotherapy: A critical review. Psychological Bulletin, 86(2), 260-175.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Boston, MA:
Northeastern University Press.
Grant, D. A. (1964). Classical and operant conditioning. In Melton, A. W. (Ed.), Categories of
Human Learning, p p. 1-31, New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc.
Gray, A. (1994). An Introduction to the Therapeutic Frame. New York, NY: Brunner-Rutledge.
Greenberg, R. P., Constantino, M. J., & Bruce, N. (2006). Are patient expectations still relevant
for psychotherapy process and outcome? Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 6 57-678.
Gregson, K., & Lane, R. C. (2000). On the beginning of dyadic therapy: The frame and the
therapeutic relationship. Journal of Psychotherapy in Independent Practice, 1(3), 3 1-41.
Guttman, N., & Kalish, H. I. (1956). Discriminability and stimulus generalization. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 51(1), 7 9-88.
Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations, and a
behavior-analytic view of the purposes of science. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 1 75-190.
Hayes, S. C., Brownstein, A. J., Zettle, R. D., Rosenfarb, I., & Korn, Z. (1986). Rule-governed
behavior and sensitivity to changing consequences of responding. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 45(3), 2 37-256.
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A view of
Steven C. Pepper’s “World Hypotheses.” Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
50, 97-111.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D. (2004). A Practical Guide to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.
New York, NY: Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization. New
York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2008). Effectiveness of antidepressants: An evidence myth constructed from a
thousand randomized trials? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 3(1),
14-22.
Jovanovic, T., Norrholm, S. D., Keyes, M., Fiallos, A., Jovanovic, S., Myers, K. M., Davis, M.,
& Duncan, E. J. (2006). Contingency awareness and fear inhibition in a human
fear-potentiated startle paradigm. Behavioral Neuroscience, 120(5), 9 94-1004.

FRAME ANALYSIS

38

Kanter, J. W., Manbeck, K. E., Kuczynski, A. M., Maitland, D. W. M., Villas-Bôas A., & Reyes
Ortega, M. A. (2017). A comprehensive review of research on Functional Analytic
Psychotherapy. Clinical Psychology Review, 58, 141-156.
Karson, M. (2006). Using Early Memories in Psychotherapy: Roadmaps to Presenting Problems
and Treatment Impasses. L
 anham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc.
Karson, M. (2008). Deadly Therapy: Lessons in Liveliness from Theater and Performance
Theory. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc.
Kohlenberg, R. J., & Tsai, M. (2007). Functional Analytic Psychotherapy: A bridge between
psychoanalysis and behavior therapy. In R. J. Kohlenberg & M. Tsai (Eds.), Functional
Analytic Psychotherapy: Creating Intense and Curative Therapeutic Relationships (pp.
169-181). New York, NY: Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
Korzybski, A. (1933). Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and
General Semantics. Berkeley, CA: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Pub. Co.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Laraway, S., Snycerski, S., Michael, J., & Poling, A. (2003). Motivating operations and terms to
describe them: some further refinements. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 36,
407-414.
Levy, M. S. (1998). A helpful way to conceptualize and understand reenactments. The Journal of
Psychotherapy Practice and Research, 7(3), 227-235.
Loy, D. (1996). Zhuangzi and Nāgājurna on the truth of no-truth. In Kjellberg, P., & Ivanhoe, P.
J. (Eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in Zhuangzi ( pp. 50-67). Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Lucy. (2012, October 26). Understanding anxiety: Broken leg vs. broken mind. R
 etrieved from
https://www.time-to-change.org.uk/blog/understanding-anxiety-broken-leg-broken-mind
on March 12th, 2018.
Newnes, C. (2004). Psychology and psychotherapy’s potential for countering the medicalization
of everything. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 44(3), 358-376.
Parker, I. (1999). Critical psychology: Critical links. Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 1,
3-18.
Parth, K., Datz, F., Seidman, C., & Löffler-Stastka, H. (2017). Transference and
countertransference: A review. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 81(2), 167-211.

FRAME ANALYSIS

39

Pavlov, I. V. (1926). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the
Cerebral Cortex. London, England: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B., & Whitehead, A. (1910, 1912, 1913). Principia Mathematica ( 3 volumes).
Cambridge, England; Cambridge University Press.
Schwartz, R. C. (1995). Internal Family Systems Therapy. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1998). Membership has its (epistemic)
rewards: Need for closure effects on in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75(2), 383-393.
Singer, P. R., & Fourcher, L. A. (1979). The psychological therapist and medicine.
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 16(3), 3 28-333.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New York, NY: Knopf.
Törneke, N., Luciano, C., & Salas, S. V. (2008). Rule-governed behavior and psychological
problems. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 8(2),
141-156.
Ward-Horner, J. C., Cengher, M., Ross, R. K., & Fienup, D. M. (2016). Arranging response
requirements and the distribution of reinforcers: A brief review of preference and
performance outcomes. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 50(1), 1 81-185.
Wilson, K. G. (2001). Some notes on theoretical constructs: Types and validation from a
contextual behavioral perspective. International Journal of Psychology and
Psychological Therapy, 1(2), 205-215.

